[A]lmost two full years have passed since the Imperial Rescript declaring war on America and Britain was graciously granted, and on the coming December 8 we will welcome the second anniversary of the start of the war. And tomorrow, November 26, is a day to be eternally recorded in our diplomatic history in connection with the outbreak of the war of greater East Asia. Particularly is it an unforgettable day for me, for I was in Washington at that time as Counsellor of the Japanese Embassy and took part in the work of the Japanese-American negotiations under Ambassadors Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura and Suburo [sic] Kurusu.
Needless to say, it was two years ago tomorrow, November 26, 1941, that the so-called November 26 Proposal, one which can be called the American Government's ultimatum concerning the Japanese-American negotiations, was handed by Secretary of State Cordell Hull to Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu.
On November 27, the day following the handing of the November 26 ultimatum to the Japanese envoys, the American authorities issued official
instructions in the name of Chief of the General Staff General George Marshall and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Harold A. Stark to Lieutenant-General Walter C. Short, commander of the Hawaiian defence forces, and Admiral Husband Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet, telling them that "there is no chance for a reopening of the Japanese-American negotiations. What moves Japan will come out, it cannot be predicted, but the Army and Navy forces at the outposts must co-operate and deal with the situation." Particularly, Marshall, in his instructions to Short, added: "You can take these instructions as a warning of war." Also based on these instructions, Kimmel toward the end of November, issued orders to "fire on any Japanese submarines which are sighted in Hawaiian waters" and thus had already ordered the start of fighting.
Japan, for its own existence and self-defence, had no other alternative than to rise up in arms and, refusing to stand any more American insolence, accept the American challenge to war.
It follows, that the rights and wrongs of Japan and America in the war of greater East Asia are already clear. In contrast to the fact that Japan possesses clear war aims based on its existence and self-defence and righteousness, aims which Japan can declare to the whole world, the United States does not possess war aims with which it can satisfy even its own people. It is the will of providence that Japan, standing on righteousness, will gain final victory.
Immediately upon the granting of the Imperial Rescript, the loyal and courageous Imperial Forces scored outstanding victories in destroying the United States Pacific Fleet at Hawaii and following that annihilating the British Eastern Fleet off Malaya. At the same time they advanced into the various areas in the southern region and within six months after the start of the war had crushed the military strongholds in East Asia of America and Britain, had swept out aggressive Anglo-American influences from East Asia and had established the foundations for the liberation of greater East Asia. Thus, did we come to see the progress of the construction of greater East Asia.
I need not repeat here that the essence of Japanese diplomacy lies in its aim to establish firmly the security of East Asia, thus to contribute to world peace, and to hold warm relations with all nations and bring about common prosperity and well-being to the world. And the ideal on which that aim is based is hakko ichiu, the great ideal of the nation's founding.
The composite manifestation of the diplomacy for the construction of new East Asia, which has been driven forward based on such a loftily spirit, was none other than the Assembly of greater East Asiatic Nations held on November 5 and 6 in Tokyo.
America and Britain underestimated Japan's material strength and complacently believed that they could force it to its knees in a long war. That was why they tried to coerce Japan into submission with the threat of waging a long war.
Once the war started, however, Japan won every battle, quickly placed
the whole of the south under its control and built up an invincible structure. Under its grand policy of fighting the war and carrying on construction work at the same time, the task of building up greater East Asia has progressed apace, the unity of greater East Asia has been tightened and the sure-to-win structure is daily being strengthened still further.
The enemy has been seized with trepidation over this development. America, the self-appointed greatest "have" country in the world, which has vaunted its ability to wage a long war is now feeling the menace of Japan's preparedness for a long war and is now impatient for a short war. What an irony!
The Soyiet [sic] offensive on the Eastern front since the summer, the termination of the campaign in North Africa, the unconditional surrender by the Badoglio régime of Italy and local situations in Europe—these drove the enemy to a hasty conclusion that the situation had changed in his favour. At once optimism reigned supreme in America. Rashly optimistic views that Germany would be defeated in the course of this year and that Japan would be crushed next year prevailed far and wide. Such views were spread by irresponsible utterances by men like James A. Farley, former U. S. Postmaster-General, who had no hesitation in boasting that the war in Europe would be brought to a finish before Christmas 1943. Most Americans were in a transport of joy.
Then came the astonishing news of the crushing defeats in the five air battles off Bougainville. The optimists in America must have been thrown headlong into the depths of pessimism.
Now, President Roosevelt has the ambition of running for a fourth time in the forthcoming presidential election, next year. For this reason he fears most the possibility of the people being estranged from him. In this situation, it is more likely that Roosevelt will keep the defeats off Bougainville in scrupulous secrecy for a year hence, that is, until after the next Presidential election, exactly as he die [sic] the disaster at Pearl Harbour.
But the successive announcements of victories by our Imperial Headquarters must have penetrated even the thick hides of the American author for a few days ago, they announced the sinking of the cruiser Northampton by the Japanese. Their traditional policy is to announce their war losses piecemeal.
What confusion would take possession of the American people if the truth were revealed to them that in the short space of three weeks between October 27 and November 27, as many as eighty-five seacraft, large and small, were sent to the bottom and, with them 30,000 lives? The American Government may resort to all sorts of petty, shameless tricks, but the bereaved families of the 30,000 wardead will surely not keep quiet, and a serious commotion is bound to arise in course of time.