New Information Chief Amau
By Kei-ichi Nagasaka
When the Tohjo Cabinet was reorganized in April last, Mr. Eiji Amau was appointed President of the Board of Information. The new information chief, because of his brilliant past records, appears to be well qualified for handling all weighty official statements and interpreting the cardinal policies of the Government. From 1933 to 1937, he was director of the now defunct Information Bureau of the Foreign Office, and during this period he successfully discharged his duties as the diplomatic spokesman of the Government. In 1934, he leaped into international prominence by issuing what is generally called the Amau declaration on non-recognition of third Power interference in purely East Asiatic affairs. Taking a strong exception to the technical assistance rendered to China by the League of Nations and the economic and military aids given to General Chiang Kai-shek by the Governments and interested quarters of Britain and the United States, spokesman Amau made an epochal statement on April, 17, 1934. It, in part, reads :
Owing to the special position of Japan in her relations with China, her views and attitude respecting matters concerning China may not agree in every point with those of foreign nations ; but it must be realized that Japan is called upon to exert the utmost effort in carrying out her mission and in fulfilling her special responsibilities in East Asia......We oppose, therefore, any attempt on the part of China to avail herself of the influence of any other country in order to resist Japan ; we also oppose any action taken by China calculated to play one Power against another. Any joint operations undertaken by foreign Powers even in the name of technical or financial assistance at this particular moment after the Manchurian and Shanghai incidents are bound to acquire political significance......Japan, therefore, must object to such undertakings as a matter of principle, although she will not find it necessary to
interfere with any foreign country negotiating individually with China on questions of finance or trade as long as such negotiations benefit China and are not detrimental to the maintenance of peace in East Asia. However, supplying China with warplanes, building aerodromes in China and detailing military instructors or military advisers to China, or contracting a loan to provide funds for political use, would obviously tend to alienate the friendly relations between Japan and China and other countries and disturb peace and order in East Asia. Japan will oppose such projects.
The Amau declaration frankly and without any diplomatic frills pointed out that to Japan the maintenance of peace and tranquillity in East Asia was of vital need, and, at the same time, requested foreign nations not to implement measures construable as harmful to the cause of Sino-Japanese harmony. London and Washington strongly resented the interpretation contained in the Amau declaration of the China policy of Tokyo. By way of registering its protest, the American Government on April 30 sent a note to the Japanese Government and specifically drew the attention of the latter to the terms of the Nine-Power Treaty. It would not be fallacious to say that Mr. Amau through his outspoken declaration unveiled the portrait of Japan's independent China policy, which thenceforward aimed at restoring stable cordial relations between the two neighbouring countries.
Prior to the outbreak of the current Pacific war, Japan did everything in its power to seek a solution of all pending Far Eastern issues in an endeavour to meet the just demands of Britian and the United States, as well as to effect an understanding with Chungking, thereby facilitating the return of peace in China. Animated by such a noble motive, the Japanese Government opened negotiations with the American Government. But the latter, spurning the good intention of the former, submitted a provoking proposal, with the result that Japan was reluctantly obliged to enter into a state of war with Britain and America as the only recourse left to settle diverse Sino-Japanese differences without the intervention or mediation of third Powers. Now that the Anglo-American interference in greater East Asia has been reduced, regardless of the contrary proclivity
of Chungking, the independent China policy of Japan, so ably outlined by Mr. Amau in 1934, has started functioning in a fairly smooth manner by receiving the required support of the Nanking Government.
Diplomatically speaking, the Amau declaration was made in the nature of a warning to Britain and America, which nations had been persistently scheming to hinder the growth of genuine Sino-Japanese harmony. They unnecessarily feared that, in the event of a Sino-Japanese accord being reached, their special rights and interests in China would suffer a great deal. This apprehension on their part was merely hypothetical, especially when the Amau declaration conveyed no such idea. It is regrettable that a section of public opinion in Japan, desiring to conciliate America at any cost, vehemently criticized the Amau declaration as a piece of inopportune statement. On top of this, certain influential circles went so far as to cold-shoulder it, for they attached prime importance to the policy of "go slow" in dealing with the United States. Nevertheless, the new turn in the China policy, on the whole, came to be accepted in the country as a settled fact.
In April, 1937, when Mr. Naotaké Sato assumed the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Amau was promoted Minister and assigned to Switzerland. During his stay in Berne, he made a detailed study of the international situation, being comparatively free from heavy diplomatic work. In September, 1939, when Admiral Nomura joined the Abé Cabinet as Foreign Minister, Mr. Amau was made Ambassador to Rome. In this new rôle, Mr. Amau displayed marked ability in strengthening the structure of the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis. Then, with the assumption in the second Konoyé Cabinet of the post of Foreign Minister by Mr. Yosuké Matsuoka, former president of the South Manchuria Railway Company and primemover in leading Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations, Mr. Amau as Ambassador to Rome made no small contribution to reinforce further the Axis unanimity of purpose. He, in conjunction with Mr. Saburo Kurusu, then Ambassador to Berlin, brought about the
conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance Pact among Japan, Germany and Italy. By virtue of this agreement, the major credit for which must be given to Mr. Matsuoka, Berlin and Rome acknowledged Japan's leadership in East Asia, while Japan recognized the leadership of Berlin and Rome in Europe, and thus the Axis solidarity was cemented to strive for organizing a new world order in replacement of the status quo policy of the Anglo-American nations.
Mr. Amau retired for a short while from diplomatic service in February, 1941 ; but, with the formation of the third Konoyé Cabinet, he was recalled to take charge of the office of Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs. In this capacity he greatly assisted Foreign Minister Admiral Teijiro Toyoda in conducting negotiations with America with a view to reaching an agreement for the settlement of the China affair. In October, 1941, the Konoyé Cabinet tendered its resignation and General Hidéki Tohjo, who was War Minister in that Cabinet, organized a new Ministry. Consequent upon the organization of the Tohjo Ministry, Mr. Amau resigned from the office of Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs. Premier General Tohjo resumed negotiations with the United States and dispatched Mr. Kurusu as special envoy to Washington for the purpose of assisting Ambassador Nomura in effecting a mutually acceptable rapprochement with the Roosevelt administration. Since the attempt failed, on account of President Roosevelt's dictatorial attitude, the war in greater East Asia eventuated as a natural development.
Until his appointment as President of the Board of Information, Mr. Amau remained somewhat inactive. A few months ago, he accepted the post of chief of the neighbourhood association department of the National Service Association—a post which he is still retaining with the object of scrutnizing closely the wartime life of the nation. Now that he has become the information chief, it is popularly expected that he will not only invigorate the thought warfare structure of Japan, but also will speed up the dissemination of accurate informations concerning the latest activity pertaining to the construction of a greater
East Asia co-prosperity sphere. In addition, because of the perfect understanding existing between him and Mr. Mamoru Shighémitsu, Foreign Minister, it is obvious that the Board of Information and the Foreign Office would function as one well-knit organization to yield greater good to wartime diplomacy and information service of the nation.
Born a second son of a wholesale fertilizer merchant of Tokushima, Shikoku, Mr. Amau, after graduating from the Kobe Higher Commercial School, prosecuted his post-graduate studies at the Tokyo Higher Commercial School. In 1912, he entered the service of the Foreign Office and successively served as consul at Antung and Sydney, embassy secretary at London and legation secretary at Berne. After that he came back to the Foreign Office as a secretary of the European and American Affairs Bureau. During the time of the Washington Conference, he acted as one of the staff members of the Japanese delegation. Then followed his appointment as consul-general at Canton and Harbin and secretary to the Japanese Emabssay in Peking. Subsequently, he served twice as chargé d'affaires in Moscow, from whence he was transferred to the Foreign Office to become director of the Information Bureau. From this list of posts he has had held, it is apparent that Mr. Amau in his early career received a sound training to educate himself as an astute diplomat. Perhaps that is why he was later assigned to Rome as Ambassador, where he offered his best service for the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance Pact. In recognition of his ability, he has now been entrusted with the administration of the information set-up of the Government.
At the time when Mr. Amau was spokesman of the Foreign Office, he exhibited a keen sense of diplomatic judgement in issuing statements and in replying to questions put by newspaper correspondents of foreign countries. He was always ready to help them in appreciating the policies of Japan and give them informations as impartially as possible. When subjected to a barrage of questions tinged with suspicious motive, he would maintain his equanimity with a broad smile and reply wittily,
thereby disarming the suspicion of the questioners. On the other hand, in voicing the reasonableness of the contentions of Japan, he would take a firm stand and present plainly the viewpoints of this country. In liberal circles of those days he was known as the enfant terrible of the Foreign Office. It may be that he nourished a militant complex being influenced by such militant diplomats as Mr. Kumataro Honda and Mr. Kénkichi Yoshizawa, under both of whom he served as secretary respectively at London and Peking. It is certainly a fact that Mr. Amau is a man of strong character. At this time of super-emergency confronting the Japanese people a man of his calibre cannot but be welcomed.
Immediately after Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations, British and American correspondents posed a number of questions to Mr. Amau for the purpose of ascertaining the future moves of this country. The day was cold and a severe biting wind was blowing. To the astonishment of the Anglo-American newspapermen, they found all the windows of Mr. Amau's room wide open. They started shutting the windows, whereupon the spokesman remarked : "The windows have just been opened. Please leave them open for a while to have more fresh air. It is good and as healthy as the open door policy you people so fondly advocate." This wisecrack elicited a roar of hearty laughter and incidentally the Anglo-American correspondents received their answer in parable. Under cover of such an enjoyable joke, Mr. Amau took the occasion to declare that Japan was following an open door policy, and that it would follow the same policy in the future for the healthy progress of East Asia. It will be refreshing to know that the Amau declaration of 1934, which was scathingly attacked by Britain and the United States, in a way tried to safeguard the legitimate special privilages and interests of foreign Powers, and for that reason it naturally sought the execution of a genuine open door policy in East Asia through Sino-Japanese collaboration and consultation. Japan parted company with the League of Nations, because Geneva, taking shelter behind non-realistic
issues, flatly refused to give its assent to the operation of a Sino-Japanese open door policy in East Asia.
Today, Mr. Amau in the capacity of the new information chief has been called upon to play a notable part in promoting the "open door" policy of Japan for the regeneration of inter-country homogeneity in greater East Asia. Britain and America devised their own plan of open door in China mainly to shut out the natural evolution in Sino-Japanese cordiality. They played China against Japan to earn benefit for themselves at the cost of both East Asiatic neighbours. The Nine-Power Treaty was concluded not for the benefit of China, but for depriving Japan of the means to foster Sino-Japanese amity. This agreement hampered the activity of Japan in regard to the promotion of East Asiatic stability. It is, indeed, fortunate that the present Tokyo-Nanking combination has receded the London-Washington open door policy to the background and has simultaneously accelerated the consummation of the long-standing ideal of independent East Asiatic "open door" doctrine cherished by the nations of this part of the world. Mr. Amau, who has all along manifested opposition to alien interference in East Asiatic affairs, has now been provided with powerful administrative authority to add his weight to the task of constructing the envisioned regional "open door" in greater East Asia.