As it was my privilege to address you but a short time ago, at the 71st session of the Imperial Diet, on Japan's foreign relations in general, I shall confine myself today to a review of developments in the China affair since that occasion.
From the beginning of the present affair, the Japanese Government, following strictly its policy of local settlement and non-aggravation, has exerted every effort to effect a speedy solution. The Nanking Government, whose prompt reconsideration was invited, failed to manifest a semblance of sincerity, and concentrated its armies in North China to challenge Japan. In the Yangtze Valley and elsewhere in South and Central China it embarked upon an anti-Japanese campaign of the most vicious nature, which not only prevented our nationals in those regions from engaging in their peaceful pursuits, but also jeopardized their very existence. In these circumstances, the Japanese Government, still desiring to avoid the disturbance of peace as far as possible, ordered the evacuation of all Japanese residents in Hankow and other points along the Yangtze River. Yet shortly after this precautionary step, on August 9th Sub-lieutenant Oyama and Seaman Saito of the Japanese Marines at Shanghai were murdered by members of the Chinese Constabulary. Even then, Japan adhered to a peaceful course, and sought to settle the affair through the withdrawal of the constabulary and the removal of all military works that had been erected in violation of the 1932 Truce Agreement. China refused to comply with our demands under one pretext or another, and proceeded, instead, to increase her troops and multiply her military works in the prohibited zone, and finally launched an unwarranted attack upon the Japanese. Thereupon, as a matter of duty, our Government despatched a small naval reinforcement to Shanghai as an emergency measure to insure the protection of our nationals in that city.
In view of these disquieting developments in Shanghai, the ambassadors at Nanking of the five Powers—Great Britain, the United States, France, Germany, and Italy—sent a joint request on August
11th both to Japan and China that the two countries do all in their power to carry out effectively a plan to exclude Shanghai from the scope of any possible hostilities so as to safeguard the lives and property of foreigners therein. Our Government replied through Mr. Kawagoe, Ambassador to China, to the effect that Japan was genuinely concerned over the safety of the lives and property of all foreigners as well as of the Japanese in Shanghai. Should China, as the first prerequisite, withdraw beyond striking distance her regular troops and the constabulary that were advancing on the Settlement and menacing the Japanese, and remove the military works in the vicinity of the International Settlement, Japan was prepared to restore her forces to their original positions. The Ambassador was also instructed to request the Powers concerned to exert their influence induce the Nanking Government to execute these urgent and necessary measures, which, however, were flatly rejected by China. On August 13th the Consuls-General at Shanghai of Great Britain, America and France submitted a concrete plan, proposing that Japan and China enter into direct negotiations for the purpose of averting the impending crisis. The text of the proposal was received in Tokyo at midnight, August 13th. But in the afternoon of that very day, the Chinese armies, which had been pouring into the Shanghai area, took the offensive, and on the 14th their warplanes dropped bombs not only on the headquarters of our Marines, a Japanese warship and our Consulate-General, but also on a wide area of the International Settlement. We could hesitate no longer to abandon all hopes for a peaceful settlement and fight for the protection of our 30,000 nationals in Shanghai. I regret to say that the earnest efforts of the Powers concerned were thus nullified by Chinese outrages.
With Shanghai converted into a theatre of hostilities, grave concern was naturally shown by the Powers who had vast amounts of capital invested and large numbers of their nationals residing in the city. Great Britain notified both Japan and China under date of August 18th, that if the governments of the two countries agreed mutually to withdraw their forces and to entrust the protection of Japanese subjects residing in the International Settlement and on the Extra-Settlement roads to foreign authorities, the British Government was prepared to undertake such responsibility provided that other Powers would cooperate. On the following day, the 19th, we were informed by the French Government of its readiness to support the British proposal. The American Government also had previously expressed its hope for the suspension of hostilities in the Shanghai area. Japan, having as great interests in Shanghai as these Powers, is equally solicitous for the peace of the city. But as has
been stated above, the actions taken by the Chinese in and around Shanghai are plainly in violation of the Truce Agreement of 1932, in that the Chinese illegitimately moved their regular troops into the zone prescribed by that Agreement, and increased both the number and armaments of the constabulary, and in that relying upon their numerical superiority, they challenged the Marines and civilian population of our country. Therefore, in its reply to the British proposal our Government explained in detail Japan's successive efforts toward a peaceful solution and stated the truth regarding the lawless Chinese attacks, and affirmed that the hostilities at Shanghai could not be brought to a close save by the withdrawal of the Chinese regular troops from the prohibited zone, and of the constabulary from the front lines. At the same time, our sincere hope was expressed that Great Britain, as one of the parties to the Truce Agreement, would use her good offices to bring about the withdrawal of the Chinese troops outside the prescribed zone. Similar replies were sent to the French and American authorities.
In North China, in wilful disregard of the various pledges and agreements, Chinese Central Armies were moved northward to indulge in a series of provocative actions, and large forces began to pour into the province of Chahar. Our Government, therefore, has had to take determined steps to meet the situation.
Thus hostilities have now spread from North to Central China, and Japan finds herself engaged in a major conflict on extended fields. I am deeply pained to say that some 50,000 Japanese residents in various parts of China have been forced to evacuate, leaving behind them their huge investments, their business interests acquired through years of arduous toil, and other rights and interests, while not a few of them have been made victims of hostilities. It is also to be regretted that nationals of third countries in China are being subjected to similar trials and tribulations. All this is due to no other cause than that the Nanking Government and also the local military régimes in China have for many years deliberately undertaken to incite public opinion against Japan as a means of strengthening their own political powers, and in collusion with communistic elements they have still further impaired Sino-Japanese relations. Now our loyal and valiant soldiers, with the united support of the nation behind them, are engaged in strenuous campaigns night and day amid indescribable hardships and privations. We cannot but be moved to hear of their heroic sacrifices as well as of their brilliant achievements.
It is hardly necessary to say that the basic policy of the Japanese Government aims at the stabilization of East Asia through conciliation
and cooperation between Japan, Manchoukuo, and China for their common prosperity and well-being. Since China, ignoring our true motive, has mobilized her vast armies against us, we can do no other than counter it by force of arms. The urgent need at this moment is that we take a resolute attitude and compel China to mend her ways. Japan has no other objective than to see a happy and tranquil North China, and all China freed from the danger of a recurrence of such calamitous hostilities as the present, and Sino-Japanese relations so adjusted as to enable us to put into practice our above-mentioned policy. Let us hope that the statesmen of China will be brought to take a broad view of East Asia; that they will speedily realize their mistakes; and that, turning over a new leaf, they will act in unison with the high aim and aspirations of Japan!