Treaties, Laws and Speeches

Texts from the Tokyo Gazette, Contemporary Japan and year books of the Japanese empire
Document

Statement of the Japanese Military Authorities, Issued through the Japanese Foreign Office Spokesman, Dated December 28, 1937 (The Ladybird Incident)

Type
Document
Date
28 December 1937
Speaker / issued by
Japanese Military Authorities (issued through the Japanese Foreign Office Spokesman)
Printed in
Tokyo Gazette, January, 1938, pp. 22-25
Section
Documents concerning the Panay and Ladybird Incidents; II. The Ladybird Incident

Regarding the incident of the shelling of British men-of-war, it is regrettable that, despite earnest endeavours to find out the true facts

in the case, investigation has been delayed since the various troops were scattered at the time, making difficult the establishment of contact because of lack of the means of communication. Immediately after the occurrence of the incident, the Army authorities despatched a staff officer of the Army Department of the Imperial Headquarters to carry on joint investigations on the spot with the authorities concerned. The results so far obtained are as follows:

I. General Situation

1\. On December 11th, the Japanese forces, in order to win the final victory after the fighting of more than a hundred days, closed in on Nanking, the capital of China. Having completed their frontal siege on land, they were vying with one another for the capture of its walls. Heavy fires broke out in the city, especially in the direction of Siakwan and dense smoke overhung the Yangtze River.

On that day, Detachment X crossed the Yangtze to its left bank at a point north of Taiping, and advanced toward Pukow in order to intercept the Chinese forces retreating from Nanking.

Simultaneously the high commander and all men of the Japanese force which had advanced to the first line (to Siaomihang Hill south of Yühuatai), assuming that the only available retreat for the hard-pressed enemy at Nanking would be by the Yangtze River, were concentrating their attention in that direction. And in view of the fact that notice had already been served on December 9th by the Japanese Consul General at Shanghai to the authorities of other Powers requesting the evacuation of their nationals from the zone of hostilities and that fighting had become intense, they did not even dream of the presence of any foreign vessels in the neighbourhood of the fighting area.

2\. However, about 3:00 o'clock (Japan Time) on the afternoon of the same day, more than ten large steamers were observed fleeing up the river from the direction of Siaokwan. The said high commander, believing them to be carrying the enemy in retreat, ordered the artillery corps nearby to fire on the ships. But as the distance was too great, the shells did not reach the ships which continued their way upstream to the chagrin of all the Japanese soldiers.

Thereupon, the high commander issued an order to the units which were expected to be in the neighbourhood of Wuhu to attack these vessels.

II. Action of Detachment Z.

1\. Detachment Z, which was ordered to intercept the enemy's retreat, made a forced march during the night of the 11th and reached the neighbourhood of Wuhu between 7:30 and 8:20 o'clock on the morning of the 12th. It occupied positions there.

On that day although the weather was fine there was dense fog from the morning. The commander of the detachment discovered along the right bank of the Yangtze at a point about three kilometres to the north of his position four large steamers anchored, which appeared to be landing men by launches. Then, at about 9:00 o'clock he noticed some of these steamers suddenly begin to emit black smoke, whereupon the commander, deciding that the enemy was trying to conceal itself behind a smoke screen, gave the order to fire. Shells were seen striking the first and second ships in the foreground. However, the ships in the rear immediately fled downstream and soon vanished from sight, while one of the ships in the front began to advance toward our forces. As she came nearer, a British flag on her was recognized. The commander of the detachment immediately issued the order to cease firing. When the ship came along the pier at Wuhu, it was discovered that she was a British man-of-war, the Ladybird.

2\. At about 10:00 o'clock, one shell was fired by mistake at a ship hoisting the British flag which was coming from upstream, but it appeared to have passed high over the vessel. This ship, when arrived at the pier, was identified as the British man-of-war, the Bee.

3\. Rear-Admiral Holt who was aboard the Bee, the British Consul who was aboard the Ladybird, and several officers, including captains of the ships, landed and met the commander of the detachment.

At this meeting the commander of Detachment Z said that as the British flag could not be discerned on account of the fog and as the ships were hidden behind black smoke, he had believed the ships to be enemy vessels. Furthermore, after explaining the circumstance regarding large numbers of defeated Chinese soldiers in the neighbourhood of Wuhu at that time who were using the Yangtze for their retreat, he stated that it was the duty of his detachment to sink all enemy vessels on the river. The British thereupon requested the commander not to fire upon them thereafter, to which the commander agreed.

Then the British expressed their desire that, in order to forestall further danger, Japanese officers be put on board the British ships,

but the commander declined to accede to this. At the request of the British, a Japanese captain was ordered to go on board the British man-of-war for the purpose of inspecting the neighbourhood. He saw behind a delta about eight kilometres down the stream six steamers and many junks loaded with Europeans and Americans.

The commander of the detachment apologized for the casualties caused aboard the British men-of-war, lent some of his help to assist in the handling of the dead and wounded, and sent as his proxies an infantry officer and an artillery officer to honour the British dead at the funeral.

The British men-of-war stayed at the pier until about noon and then departed.

III. Conclusion

As has been described above, it was by no means suspected, either by the high commander on the spot or by any of the units on the first line, that there might be any vessels of third Powers in the dangerous fighting area particularly at the time of severe encounters, when, as a matter of fact, with a part of the Japanese forces already at Pukow across the Yangtze, the possible path of retreat for Chinese forces was limited solely to the Yangtze River.

Contrary to the judgment of our forces, the facts were that there were British ships in the fighting area. These ships not only could not be recognized as British on account of the dense fog, but seemed to be landing retreating Chinese on the shore; moreover, the movements of the ships were such as to make them appear to be trying to hide behind a smoke screen. In these circumstances the commander of the detachment issued the order to fire at the vessels. The attack, therefore, was not made in the knowledge that the vessels were of British nationality. That the firing was entirely unintentional will be understood by those who know the actual conditions in a battlefield where occurrences of unexpected and extraordinary events are so numerous. All these circumstances notwithstanding, we sincerely regret that there should have taken place the present unfortunate affair.

Transcription note

The source prints both "Siakwan" and "Siaokwan"; and "Detachment X" in section I but "Detachment Z" in section II - all as printed.

← PreviousSir Robert L. Craigie's Note to Mr. Koki Hirota, Dated December 16, 1937 (The Ladybird Incident)Next →Mr. Koki Hirota's Note to Sir Robert L. Craigie, Dated December 28, 1937 (The Ladybird Incident)