STATEMENT OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT IN VIRTUE OF PARAGRAPH 5 OF ARTICLE 15 OF THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE
February 25, 1933
PART I
Japan's co-operation with the League of Nations
Japan has taken the greatest interest in the development and success of the League from the days of its inception. Her successive governments have extended to it for nearly fourteen years their hearty co-operation, and her statesmen have devoted their best efforts to the extention [sic] of its influence and the enhancement of its prestige. Japan takes pride in recalling the active participation of her representatives in the work of the League. As an original and permanent Member of the Council, she has had many opportunities of co-operation in its beneficial activities, and of these opportunities she has fully availed herself. She regards the League as a most powerful instrument for the good of humanity ; and she is only anxious, in the interest of this great experiment in the establishment of universal peace, that the Members of the League shall fully appreciate the situation in the Far East and deal with it in a practical way rather than by formulae and principles.
The present dispute was first brought by China to the consideration of the Council of the League of Nations under Article 11 of the Covenant in September, 1931. In spite of the fact that Japan in this case was obliged to act solely in self-defence against aggression on the part of China, Japan, from the very beginning, has spared no effort in explaining to the League the facts and background of this unfortunate incident, and at the same time, she has constantly, and without waiting for the Resolution passed by the Council on September 30, endeavoured as far as possible not to aggravate the situation. Japan has also from time to time communicated to the League all information relative to the development of the situation, so that the League might be enabled to understand the actual conditions prevailing in the Far East.
Unfortunately, however, the condition of Manchuria showed no immediate improvement in the matter of peace and order, owing to the continued activities
of Chang Hsueh-liang, while the feelings of the Chinese and the Japanese peoples became further strained, with the result that there was no possibility of withdrawing the Japanese troops within the Railway Zone under the then existing circumstances. When the Council met again in October, Japan realized the importance of allaying the excited national feelings of the two peoples as the first essential condition of securing the safety of the lives and property of Japanese subjects and of making possible the withdrawal of the Japanese troops. She was convinced that for this purpose, it was necessary for the two parties concerned to pave the way for direct negotiations, with the object of restoring normal relations between the two countries. Japan took pains to explain this view to the President and certain Members of the Council, but proposal to initiate direct negotiations was not accepted.
Moreover, the Council formed a plan to invite a representative of the United States, a non-Member State of the League, to participate in its deliberations as an observer. To this proposition Japan raised an objection, contending that participation in the proceedings of the Council by a state not a Member of the League is contrary to its constitution, but the other Members of the Council insisted on regarding the step as a mere matter of procedure, and they invited a United States observer to the Council. Japan remained convinced that this was a matter which concerned the constitution of the League and that the action of the majority constituted a clear case of the violation of the Covenant. It became apparent that if the opinion of her fellow-members was that such an important matter of substance could be decided by a majority as a mere matter of procedure, she had ratified the Covenant under an error. However, owing to her strong desire to uphold the cause of the League, she continued to participate in the activities of the Council.
The discrepancy between the views of the other Members of the League and those entertained by Japan arose from a lack of understanding of the Far Eastern situation on the part of the League. In her desire to assist the League and to maintain its legitimate influence and usefulness, Japan proposed at the Council meeting held in November, 1931, that the League should dispatch a Commission of Enquiry to China so that its Members might be able to understand fully the actual conditions prevailing in that country. This proposal was adopted by the Council in its Resolution of December 10.
The Commission of Enquiry headed by Lord Lytton reached China in March, 1932, by way of Japan and entered Manchoukuo in April. Japan rendered every facility to the Commission in order to assist its investigations. Through the establishment of the new State of Manchoukuo, especial difficulty was encountered in the matter of the entrance of the Chinese Assessor into the territory of that State. Japan therefore exerted her good offices with Manchoukuo in order to smooth over this difficulty, and enabled the Commission to carry out its investigations.
The Report of the Commission of Enquiry was made public on October 1, 1932. On account of the brief period allowed for the investigation of the Commission, much remained to be desired for the Report to claim to present a true picture of the actual condition of China. Accordingly, Japan, on November 18 last, handed to the League her Observations on the Lytton Report in order to provide it with accurate materials for coming to a fair conclusion on the questions involved.
The Lytton Report was the subject of deliberation by the Council from November 21, and by the Assembly from December 6, 1932. The Committee of Nineteen appointed by the Assembly without the concurrence of Japan drafted on December 15 a Resolution and a Statement of Reasons concerning the procedure to be followed in performing the duty of conciliation which devolved upon that body in accordance with Paragraph 3, Article 15 of the Covenant. Japan proposed the deletion from the Draft Resolution of passages regarding the participation of states which were not members of the League, and also the modification of certain points relating to the proposed Committee of Conciliation as well as the entire deletion of the last paragraph of the Statement
of Reasons, which declared in particular that the maintenance and recognition of the present régime in Manchuria could not be considered as solution.
At the same time, considering that Paragraph 3 of Article 15 represents the final resort provided for in the Covenant for conciliatory solution of a dispute, Japan endeavoured to discover some compromise which would enable her to continue her co-operation with the League.
As stated in Part II, M of the Report, the President of the Committee and the Secretary General were authorized to enter into conversations with both the Japanese and Chinese Delegations. The conversations between the Japanese Delegation and the Secretary General were carried on from the first part of January, 1933. As a result of these conversations, a draft was drawn up, and it was referred with the knowledge of the President of the Committee to the Japanese Government for their approval. Subsequently, when amendments of the Japanese Government to this draft were communicated to the Committee of Nineteen, it was made known to the Japanese Delegation that the said draft could not be taken up as a basis of further negotiation. This caused a great surprise to the Japanese Government as they had every reason to believe that the President of the Committee, who together with the Secretary General was authorized to conduct negotiations with the both Delegations, was also fully aware of the conversations and raised no objection to the preparation of the draft.
Though the Committee finally agreed to the deletion from the Draft Resolution of passages relating to the participation of non-Member States in the work of the proposed Committee of Conciliation, it proposed that the Japanese Government accept the rest of the text of the Resolusion [sic] and the Statement of Reasons of December 15 and make a reservation in regard to the last Paragraph of the Statement of Reasons to which Japan had taken objection. The declaration contained in this Paragraph would, as is stated elsewhere in the present statement, not only constitute an action ultra vires on the part of the League but prejudice the whole question
and imply a direct attack on the policy followed by the Japanese Government with respect to the existence of Manchoukuo. Furthermore, such an attitude on the part of the League was in no way in accord with the idea of conciliation advocated by the Committee of Nineteen as well as by the Japanese Government. For these reasons, Japan found it impossible to accept the proposal of the Committee.
Upon the refusal of the Japanese Delegation to agree to the Committee's proposal in this regard, the latter set to the procedure of drafting a Report under Paragraph 4 of Article 15.
However, the Japanese Government refused to give up the hope for conciliation, and in their final efforts to achieve this end, they agreed to withdraw the various amendments which they had presented when the text of December 15 was communicated to them and consented to accept as the basis of conciliation the principles and conclusions of Chapter 9 of the Lytton Report, in so far as they were applied in a way to "harmonize with the events which have taken place", which phrase is an almost literal quotation from that Report itself. Further they agreed to the maintenance of the last Paragraph of the President's Declaration (formerly called the Statement of Reasons) on the condition that its wording be modified in such a way that it would not appear to constitute a prejudgment and an attack directed against the policy of the Japanese Government vis-à-vis Manchoukuo.
The Committee of Nineteen found this final proposal likewise unacceptable. Thus the Committee rejected all the Japanese proposals and came to the conclusion that conciliation under Paragraph 3 was impossible. The Committee forthwith proceeded with the drafting of a Report under Paragraph 4 of Article 15 of the Covenant. The Draft Report thus prepared was submitted to the Assembly on February 21, and in spite of the negative vote on the part of Japan, it was adopted by the Assembly on February 24.
PART II
Errors in the Report concerning the chief characteristics of the dispute
The Report sets forth in Part III what are termed the "chief characteristics of the dispute". It is most regrettable that this part of the Report is substantially based upon the Report of the Commission of Enquiry. As stated in that Report, "the issues involved in this conflict are not as simple as they are often represented to be. They are, on the contrary, exceedingly complicated and only an intimate knowledge of all the facts as well as of their historical background should entitle anyone to express a definite opinion upon them". It must be remembered that the Commission of Enquiry spent only six weeks in Manchuria and fifteen in China, most of which was passed in Peiping, and their trip covered only a very limited area of China—a few open ports where the real condition of China could not have thoroughly been studied. In these circumstances, it was impossible for them to acquire "an intimate knowledge of all the facts as well as their historical background".
Hence the document is not as complete as it should be. It is quite natural that there should be not a few errors in the Report of the Assembly which was drafted upon the basis of the Lytton Report. These errors might have been avoided if the Committee of Nineteen had taken into due consideration the Observations of the Japanese Government presented to the Council on November 18, 1932. At any rate, it must be said that the Lytton Report, admirable and praiseworthy as it is, is not a document which one can look upon as containing all the facts as well as all the historical background upon which alone final judgment should be based. The errors in the Report of the Assembly are numerous. Let only the most salient be cited :-
(1) The Report appears to cling in Part III to the fiction that China exists today as a single organized state to be dealt with on the same footing as any country in Europe or America. The fiction happens to be merely a convenient formula which embodies in a concise form the generous aspirations of the Powers for the recovery of China as a unified and orderly state. Japan has worked hard to act upon that formula during these many years, and she is prepared to continue on the same lines in cases where ordinary matters alone are concerned. But where her vital necessities come into play as in Manchuria, she is forced to reconsider that fiction, and to ask herself what are the actual facts, and who are the actual rulers. States which are Members of the League of Nations and have little interest in China can afford to preserve the convenient fiction intact without serious difficulty. But Japan, in a totally different position, economically and strategically, is compelled, however reluctantly, to examine and set a limit to the fiction and to direct her course according to realities.
It is the view of the Japanese Government that the erstwhile Chinese State ceased to rule in Manchuria when "the fall of the United Republic after the death of Yuan Shi-kai in 1915 signalized the break-up of all unity of government in China". (Observations of the Japanese Government, page 15).
As a matter of fact, none of the governments including the Nanking Government maintains authority over China save over the limited areas which it actually controls. That is why the Japanese Government in their Observations insist that Manchuria is not naturally and necessarily an integral part of China. It will then be asked, as it has been asked,—"why did Japan invoke the Nanking Government at the outset of the Manchurian Incident? Why did Japan negotiate with Peking in 1915? Why did she declare Manchuria to be a part of China in 1922?" The answer is that Japan clung until the last moment to the fiction of Manchuria being an integral part of China. She had many excellent opportunities of departing from it, if she had wished, afforded by the chaotic state of the country. She steadily refrained from availing herself of the opportunities. But when chaos came to threaten her whole position in Manchuria, it became necessary for her to take measures to protect her various interests and important rights.
It should be observed at this point that Japan is not setting a precedent for defying the existence of a neighbour state merely because it is weak or disturbed by internal disruption.
It is needless to say that so long as the government of a state which has actually ruled the whole area maintains its authority in any part of its territory, so long does the state continue to subsist and to remain inviolable. The peculiar circumstances of China do not reside in the fact that its common government is weak or distracted by disruption. They reside in the unique fact that no authority which now exists has ever been a common government of China at all, and none therefore has title to rule the entire country.
The League of Nations should not forget that fact overrides form, and that a state must possess a single and continuous government.
(2) The Report, in agreeing that the Chinese boycott against Japan imposed after the September 18 Incident falls within the province of retaliatory measures, sows the seeds of incalculable future trouble for each and every Power interested in China. All the major Powers conduct military operations in China under certain circumstances, and maintain armed forces in Chinese territory for that specific purpose. If the adoption by the Powers of any forcible measure for the protection of their rights and interests is on each occasion to be the subject of a retaliatory boycott, the application of force will of necessity be extended without limit.
By their acceptance of the Resolutions of September 30 and of December 10, 1931, China and Japan agreed that they should take the necessary measures to prevent any aggravation of the situation. The Japanese Government desire to call the attention of the League to the fact that it was the conspicuous failure on the part of China to take such proper measures that led to the regrettable Shanghai Incident. It should also be added that in any discussion of the boycott the fact of anti-foreign education in schools and the "revolutionary foreign policy" (admitted by the Nanking Government) should not be left out of consideration, as these three subjects are inseparably bound together.
(3) The Report quotes and adopts from the Lytton Report the reference to the possibility of an arbitral settlement of the Sino-Japanese dispute.
But arbitration presupposes a normal organized state with a government supreme throughout its territory and capable of enforcing an award. China, as has been stated above, has not for years been in such a state, at any rate so far as to render it possible to arbitrate with her in vital matters concerning Manchuria. With whom would the arbitration have proceeded? With Chang Hsueh-liang whom the League does not recognize? Or with the Nanking Government whose authority (as the Report of the Commission of Enquiry showed) he did not obey? Japan, with her vital interests at stake, could not and cannot possibly resort to arbitration in such a matter with such a country as China.
(4) The Report again quotes and adopts the refusal of the Commission of Enquiry to recognize as measures of self-defence the military operations of the Japanese army on the night of September 18, although it does not exclude the possibility that the Japanese officers on the spot might have thought they were acting in self-defence. This is simply another case of a facile and uncritical acceptance of the opinions of the Commission of Enquiry, utterly ignoring the emphatic contradiction contained in the Observations of the Japanese Government. On what grounds can the League or any other third party pronounce a verdict on the case contrary to the judgment of the Japanese officers on the spot? The right of self-defence is one of those inalienable rights of a state which may be duly exercised in certain specific circumstances, and the question of on what occasion and to what extent that right should be exercised is a matter which can be determined only by the state concerned. In this connection the Japanese Government in their Observations have referred to the reservations made by both France and the United States in concluding the Pact of Paris; a reference which the Assembly found it possible to pass over in silence.
The Report in stating that the operations of the Japanese army, viewed as a whole as they developed through the entire period of the conflict, cannot be regarded as an act of self-defence, fails to take into cognizance the tension which existed, the overwhelming forces
by which the Japanese were faced and the utter uncertainty which prevailed as to the probable action of those forces. Above all, it fails to take into account the vital rights and interests of Japan in Manchuria, which are not confined to the leased territory and the railways, but involve mining and forestry, consular police and consular jurisdiction, residence and trade throughout the entire region. When these rights and interests are threatened, the measures for their protection may have to be extended throughout Manchuria. But never have Japanese military operations exceeded the bounds of necessity for self-protection.
In order that it may not be supposed over sub silentio, the Japanese Government take this opportunity of explicitly denying the specific conclusion reached in the Report that no question can arise of Chinese responsibility for the development of events since September 18, 1931, and that the use of boycotts by China subsequent to that date falls under the category of reprisals. Even if the theory that the Japanese military action did not constitute lawful self-defence should be accepted, that clearly would not invest the Chinese with an unlimited license to behave as they chose to, and to enter upon a career of unrestricted violence and wrong. Much more is this the case if, as Japan contends, the actions of her troops were urgently called for by the necessities of self-defence. How can reprisals possibly be exercised against a lawful act? The proper reply to acts of self-defence is negotiation and explanation and not reprisals, which generally lead to war. Had the United States exercised reprisals in the Carolina case, war with England must have ensued. Again it must be noted that the Resolution of September 30 precludes either party from aggravating the situation; and it would seem strange to hold that this meant that China might take steps which would certainly aggravate it, leaving Japan alone responsible for any untoward development.
What appears to be a most curious statement is found in Part III of the Report which reads: "adoption of measures of self-defence does not exempt a state from complying with the provisions of Article 12 of the Covenant".
As has already been observed by the Japanese Government, the right of self-defence is exercised upon the occasion "of an urgent"—to quote Webster's definition—"and overwhelming necessity allowing no choice of means and no instant for deliberation". To enquire the observance upon such an occasion of Article 12 of the Covenant, which stipulates that the right of self-defence may be exercised three months after the award by the arbitrators or the judicial decision or the Report of the Council of the League has been made public, is to deny the right of self-defence itself.
(5) The Report says that the declaration of independence by Manchoukuo was not spontaneous. Since the statement is based upon no fresh investigation conducted at a later date, it may be readily gathered that the Report has here again adopted the erroneous conclusions of the Commission of Enquiry contained in Chapter VI of the latter's Report, the baselessness of which has been fully exposed in the Observations of the Japanese Government.
It must strike an impartial observer as extraordinary that the Assembly repeats this finding of the Commission of Enquiry in face of the emphatic denials of Japan. There are two factors which may partly account for this. First, the movement during the tyrannous régime of the Changs for the keeping of Manchuria aloof from all participation in the affairs of China Proper was subterranean, and had no repercussion in the outside world; and the authors of the Report may therefore have been sceptical of its existence. Secondly, they appear to be misled by giving implicit credence to the legend of the so-called "continental policy" of Japan, and her supposed plan to seek a political solution of the Manchurian issue as a step towards the execution of that policy. It is unnecessary to repeat that the Japanese "continental policy" is a mere Chinese fabrication, and that Japan harbours no territorial designs in any part of the world. But all this, though it may explain the rejection by the Assembly of the uncompromising denial made by Japan, can hardly be thought to excuse it.
The simple fact is that, as has so often been explained, on the disappearance of all the administrative organisations, such as they were, which had existed under the Changs, spontaneous local organisations naturally sprung up, and the Japanese troops which were responsible for the maintenance of order necessarily co-operated with them. It was a proper and necessary step, and in the circumstances an unavoidable one. Such was the whole significance of the presence of Japanese troops, and such was the sole aim of the activities of Japanese civil and military officers. Unfortunately the Commission of Enquiry, and consequently the Assembly, in their implicit reliance on the assumption that there had never existed any independence movement in Manchuria, have been obliged to attribute to the activities of Japanese civil and military officers the independence which was actually proclaimed,—and to do so upon no solid grounds whatever.
As to the assertion that the people of Manchuria are hostile to the new state, again there is no valid evidence beyond fifteen hundred letters of dubious origin received by the Commission of Enquiry. The Japanese Government desire to point out the fact that within less than a year since its foundation, Manchoukuo has achieved a marked and healthy progress in the restoration of law and order, and that no criticism or complaint has been heard of regarding its conduct of affairs, whether domestic or foreign.
Regardless of the attitude of the Assembly to the new State of Manchoukuo, she has gone forward steadily on the road of progress. Freed from the yoke of misgovernment under the tyrannous rule of the Changs, thirty million inhabitants of Manchuria, Machus, Mongols and Chinese all alike, have, already begun to reap the benefits of their labours which were denied them in former days. Throughout most of the country banditry has been suppressed. Those hostile elements, largely composed of the remnants of Chang Hsueh-liang's troops and receiving not inconsiderable assistance from their former war lord, had constituted an obstacle to the establishment of peace throughout the territory. Thanks, however, to the combined efforts of the Japanese and Manchoukuo forces, they have been practically cleared out of the Provinces of Fengtien, Kirin, and Heilungkiang, and the security of life and property has been reestablished in these Provinces. It is only in the Province of Jehol that the organized opposition still continues.
In the domain of finance, something entirely unknown in the history of China has been realized in Manchoukuo. Though the State is still in its infancy, a sound budgetary system has been initiated, and is being carried out with utmost satisfaction. The establishment of the central bank, which is functioning on the same lines as those of the advanced countries of the world, has contributed much to the stabilization of state finances and to the economic and industrial development of the country. A similar progress has also been noted in the domain of railway administration, commerce and industry, and with abundant resources with which she is endowed, there is every prospect of this country achieving, in days to come, a still greater progress along these lines to the benefit of her inhabitants and foreigners.
All this could not have been the case had the population of the country been hostile or even sullenly submissive. It is to be regretted therefore that the Assembly should have, without referring to the Observations submitted by Japan, accepted the assumption of the Commission of Enquiry, which, here again, has no foundation in fact.
(6) The Report dwells upon the need of international co-operation in the reconstruction of China, and mentions the provision of technical assistance as one form of that international co-operation. Obviously, the reconstruction of China cannot be accomplished by any such superficial and inadequate means. It could only be rendered possible by some forceful international intervention of such a nature as would at once prove incompatible with the stipulations of the Nine Power Treaty regarding the administrative integrity and political independence of China. That is another proof that it is necessary to allow ample elasticity by taking due account of changing conditions in the application of the Nine Power Treaty and the
Covenant of the League as far as China is concerned.
PART III
Impracticabilities of the Recommendations
(1) Japan recognizes that the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Pact of Paris constitute the basic principles of the settlement of international disputes in so far as international relations in general are concerned. But a certain degree of elasticity must be allowed in the application of these principles to such special and entirely abnormal conditions as prevail in China.
(2) As to the proposal for the withdrawal of troops contained in Section 2, (1), (A) of Part IV of the Report, it is to be noted that the presence of Japanese troops outside the Railway Zone, so far from being incompatible with legal principles, has from the very beginning been due entirely to the sheer necessities of lawful self-defence, and is in no way derogatory to the accepted principles regarding the settlement of international disputes. It is further to be noted that these Japanese troops are now responsible, in accordance with the Japan-Manchoukuo Protocol, for the maintenance of peace and order in Manchoukuo. It is true that by the Resolutions of September 30 and of December 10, 1931, Japan undertook to withdraw her troops within the Railway Zone in so far as the safety of her subjects was assured, but the condition attaching to that undertaking, namely the assurance of safety of life and property, has never been satisfied; and the undertaking itself has now become inapplicable on account of the independence of Manchoukuo and the conclusion of the agreements embodied in the Protocol signed on September 15 last. Should the Japanese troops be withdrawn from the Railway Zone in accordance with the recommendation contained in the Report, it would be inevitable that unrest and disturbances would ensue in the evacuated territory. Those Members of the League that have but little direct interest in the affairs of the Far East can afford to maintain that the upholding of abstract formulae is more important than the maintenance of the peace in this part of the world. But Japan, vitally concerned in the maintenance of peace and order in Manchuria, cannot tolerate that that region should again be plunged into disorder. It cannot be supposed that a gendarmerie system as proposed by the Lytton Report would remove all apprehensions on this score. There is no precedent in the history of the world in which the security of such a vast territory was secured by gendarmerie. The proposition is absurd and cannot be put into practice. If the Japanese troops were withdrawn, the country would be quickly overrun by bandits and by Chang Hsueh-liang's troops resulting in anarchy and disorder.
(3) As to Section 2, (1) of Part IV of the Report, where it is stated that the sovereignty over Manchuria belongs to China, it has to be noted that at any rate since the year 1916, Manchuria has never been subject to the authority of China, and that in the final analysis, the present difficulty has been caused by the supposition that the sovereignty of China actually extended and extends to that region. It is entirely superfluous to say that the enforcement of this fiction will never ensure the protection of Japan's rights and interests and the maintenance of peace in the Far East. Inasmuch as the Report repudiates the restoration of the old régime as leading merely to a repetition of disorder and friction, so any return to the fiction in question must equally be repudiated. Nor is it possible for Japan to admit any policy which is incompatible with the simple fact of the existence of the State of Manchoukuo and the provisions of the Japan-Manchoukuo Protocol.
(4) With regard to the ten principles set out in the Lytton Report and cited in Section I of Part IV of the Report, apart from the observations made above, the Japanese Government deem it sufficient to quote the following passages from their Observations presented to the League in November last:—
"Certain of these principles to which the Japanese Government have no fundamental objection, have already found concrete application in the Protocol signed by Japan and Manchoukuo. But in any view of the matter, it must evi-
dently be impossible, so long as the anarchical state of things in China persists, to arrive at a satisfactory solution of the questions at issue on the basis of the first nine of these principles, especially Principles 4-9 inclusive. As is sustained in Principle 10, these nine principles cannot be practically applied 'without a strong central government in China'."
(5) In Section 2, (3) of Part IV of the Report, the Assembly contemplates the establishment of a Committee to assist in the negotiations which are to be opened between the two parties in accordance with the method specified in the Report. This, however, is directly contrary to the insistence of Japan not to allow any third party to intervene in the Manchurian problem, and Japan finds it absolutely impossible to accept such a proposal. As, moreover, the Recommendations referred to as (1), (A) and (1), (B) of Section 2, Part IV of the Report, must be dismissed as unpractical, and those made under (2) of the said Section 2 are equally inapplicable in the present state of China, there would seem to be no scope left for the activities of the proposed Committee.
(6) The Report states in effect in Section 3 of Part IV that the maintenance and recognition of the existing régime in Manchuria is no solution and that the Members of the League should, after having adopted the Report, abstain from recognizing the present régime either de jure or de facto. Further it expresses the hope that the States non-Members of the League who are signatories of the Pact of Paris and the Nine Power Treaty will associate themselves with the view set forth in the Report in this regard. The Japanese Government cannot but consider that the Assembly, in proposing in such a manner to influence or to bind, if only morally, both Member and non-Member states in the matter of recognizing or not recognizing another state, is exceeding its powers conferred upon it by Article 15 of the Covenant. In any case, in making a proposition of this nature the League of Nations whose primary duty is the preservation of peace throughout the world could not surely contribute to the maintenance of peace and security not only in Manchoukuo, but also in the Far East. Such an action on the part of the League would prove to be an obstacle to the good understanding and friendly relations between nations upon which peace depends.
PART IV
Conclusion
The Japanese Government are fully convinced that the action of the Japanese army on the night of September 18, 1931, and thereafter has never exceeded the limits appropriate to measures of self-defence, and that Manchoukuo has been founded by the spontaneous will of the people of Manchuria. Accordingly, they consider that neither the action of the Japanese army in Manchuria, nor the conclusion of the Japan-Manchoukuo Protocol is in violation of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Nine Power Treaty, the Pact of Paris, or any other international treaty. The Japanese Government maintain that in view of the quite abnormal condition of China, where no existing authority has ever ruled the entire country, and particularly in view of the unparalleled complexity and peculiarity of the Manchurian problem, and also having regard to the anti-foreign character of the policy of the National Government, it is impossible to think of applying to the present dispute the general formulae applicable to an ordinary international question; and they maintain moreover that neither any procedure which may be adopted for such an exceptional case, nor any solution thereby attained, can ever establish a precedent for ordinary cases of international dispute. Were it possible to apply ordinary formulae, the plans adumbrated by the Assembly would themselves be ruled out of consideration as interferences with what the Assembly regards as Chinese sovereign rights.
Unfortunately, the Assembly, through the refusal of its Members to face facts, and their uncritical acceptance of the Report of the Commission of Enquiry, has only indulged in academic and inadequate principles. The Assembly stands, if it may so be said, for mere formulae; Japan for solid realities. Japan takes her stand on established principles; the Assembly on precon-
ceived hypotheses. It results from the refusal of the Assembly to go beyond the Lytton Report. As pointed out in the preceding part of the present statement, the new State of Manchoukuo has made rapid progress. Peace and order are superseding banditry. Commerce and industry have responded to the improved situation, to the benefit of foreigners and the people of Manchoukuo alike. This is a concrete proof of the truth of the Japanese contention that the recognition and encouragement of the Manchurian State is the only road to a satisfactory solution of the Manchurian question and to the maintenance of a lasting peace in the Orient.
On the other hand, it appears impossible to look for any improvement in the Chinese situation in the near future, and China is likely to remain a chronic anxiety to the rest of the world. Communism has already invaded China, and the alarming extent and success of the invasion is far too seldom realized. A communized China would constitute a problem for Europe and America beside which other questions would pale into insignificance. But a Manchuria free from Chinese connection constitutes a barrier to the communistic danger in the Far East. Its value ought surely to be apparent to every statesman. It is earnestly hoped that the League of Nations will soon be led to change its attitude, to discard reliance on academic and inapplicable doctrine and to respect and recognize the forces that are actually rendering possible the maintenance of peace in the various regions of the world. The Covenant of the League of Nations itself provides in Article 21 for the due recognition of regional understandings, and the Japan-Manchoukuo Protocol of September 15, 1932, falls incontestably within the category of understandings such as these, as the special interests of Japan in Manchuria have again and again been recognized. At the same time, Japan takes this opportunity of repeating her disclaimer of all desire for territorial gains or commercial advantages.