THE SITUATION IN CHINA
I
—ACTIVITIES OF THE JAPANESE MILITARY FORCES IN CHINA AND MANCHOUKUO—
Bureau of Information, War Department
The Luan Campaign
THE broad Luan Plain in southern Shansi Province was the locale of renewed military operations during the first half of July, after a lull of more than a year in that sector.
Japanese military forces had gained complete control of the area last year in a three-month campaign starting in February, withdrawing later for strategical reasons.
Early this summer, however, the enemy again moved into the region and established a base for guerilla operations. Consequently, another Japanese clean up campaign was launched on July 3 and was carried off successfully in a fortnight against 16 divisions of Chinese, totalling 195,000 men, despite intense heat and torrential rains, encountered in turn, and the tortuous topography of the southern Shansi region.
Enemy Movements
The enemy extended its line of communication from Luan (Changchih) to Loyang, on the south bank of the Yellow River, via Yuanku and Menghsien. General Wei Li-huang, at the head of 95,000 Central Army Forces, took up a position in the mountainous region east of the Tatung-Puchow Railway. The 45,000 Communist troops, with the 129th Division as their nucleus, were stationed at Liaohsien, Yushe and Chinhsien and approximately 55,000 provincial troops under General Sun Tien-ying were deployed south of Luan. From these positions, they made frequent forays against the Tatung-Puchow, Shihchiachwàng-Taiyuan and Peking-Hankow railway lines.
The 40th Chinese Army under General Pang Ping-hsun was ordered to invade Tsechow in southern Shansi Province, while the troops under General Sun were reorganized and incorporated with the regular army. The Communist troops under General Chu Teh set up headquarters at Luan, establishing primitive arsenals at Chinhsien and other places.
Progress of the Campaign
The Japanese units participating in the campaign converged on Luan Plain simultaneously from all directions, north, south, west and east, effectively
covered by the air force and steadily tightening their cordon around the Chinese troops.
The Japanese Yamazaki, Kawasaki, Kimura and Sasaki units started their operations from the Shihchiachwang-Taiyuan Railway and occupied Liaohsien, Yushe, Chinhsien and other enemy bases in quick succession. These units succeeded in reducing Luan on July 12.
The Japanese Mineki and Oikawa detachments drove north from Tsinghwachen and attacked the 106th and 30 divisions of the Chinese 40th Army, under command of General Pang, which had established strong positions on the Honan-Shansi border. On July 11 they broke through and on July 19 occupied Tsechow, where General Pang's forces had established headquarters.
Within a fortnight of the start of the drive, all important enemy bases had been captured. At the height of the campaign, heavy downpours in southern Shansi washed out highways and forced the Japanese troops to march through quagmires. Some of the Japanese troops were marooned for days, entirely out of communication with the rear. Provisions were dropped by parachute from army planes.
The Japanese forces are continuing their mopping up campaign against the remnants in the Luan sector, although resistance is negligible.
Strained Japanese-Soviet Relations
The strained relations between Japan and the Soviet Union are reflected directly in the present border trouble between Manchoukuo and Outer Mongolia, which is being aggravated with every fresh clash.
Although the Changkufeng Incident of July, 1938, between Japan and the Soviet, disclosed various weaknesses on the part of the Red Army, it nevertheless was bold enough to provoke the present incident near Nomonhan last May.
At the same time, the Soviet Union has brought intolerable pressure to bear on the Japanese oil and coal concessions in North Saghalien, as explained elsewhere in this issue, while it is doing everything possible to restrict Japanese fishery interests in northern waters. Thus, the whole attitude of the Soviet Union toward Japan is marked by provocation.
The chief motive of the Soviet provocation against Japan may be seen in her Far Eastern policy. Other factors are the German-Japanese-Italian Anti-Comintern Pact, the progress of the five-year industrial plan and apparent under-estimation of Japan's military resources. Such being the case, the only effective way for Japan to deal with the situation will be to foster her national resources and complete war preparations against the Soviet Union. Japan has not the slightest intention of provoking a war, but she must be fully prepared and determined to meet any challenge with armed forces. In this connection, special attention must be directed to the fact that Soviet troops, on full war footing, are deployed along the borders separating Manchoukuo, the Soviet Union and Outer Mongolia for a distance of some 5,000 kilometres. In the Nomonhan sector alone, the Soviet Union has mobilized four or five modern mechanised corps.
To meet such a situation, it is but natural for Japan to assign a sufficient
number of troops to the threatened area. With this situation prevailing, no one can tell whether or not a minor clash will develop into large-scale hostilities. The nation must be fully aware that it now is facing a situation wherein a major international conflict on the China-Soviet fronts has already been developed.
Outer Mongolian Provocations
The Nomonhan Incident which has been discussed at length in previous issues of TOKYO GAZETTE is another in the long chapter of unwarranted provocations by Outer Mongolia, which has become a Soviet puppet.
In the four-year period between April, 1935 and April, 1939, there have been no less than 108 disputes between Manchoukuo and Outer Mongolia, including cases of border violations, kidnapping of Manchoukuo subjects, firing on Manchoukuo patrols and citizens, demand for the removal of border patrol stations, seizure of Manchoukuo territory and illegal aerial reconnaissance by the Outer Mongolian Army. A few cases which occurred in the Nomonhan area are mentioned below:
On June 23, 1935, Outer Mongolian regulars crossed the border near Holstengohl and kidnapped a surveying engineer, employed by the Kwantung Army, and his Russian assistant, also seizing their surveying apparatus.
On November 6, 1935, two Mongol regulars, assigned to the border outpost at Soktosumburu, crossed the border to steal timber from Manchoukuo territory. When they were arrested by Manchoukuo border patrols, the latter were fired on by Outer Mongolian troops.
On October 4, 1938, 24 members of a Japanese surveying party were fired on by five Mongol cavalrymen near the the Halha River, which forms the border between Manchoukuo and Outer Mongolia.
On January 12, this year, a squad of Mongol soldiers crossed the border at Dongoluluobo southwest of Nomonhan, but were driven away by the Manchoukuo border guards. Five days later, a Mongol woman—citizen of Manchoukuo—was outraged by a trooper of the Outer Mongolian Army in the the same region.
On January 19, a party of 15 soldiers crossed the borders and entered Nomonhan to exchange shots with the local Manchoukuo police force.
These transgressions took place with increasing frequency during the next three months, leading up to the frontal clash in May.
The Manchoukuo Government had protested to the Outer Mongolian Government on every occasion, but the Mongol forces persisted in their provocative acts without the slightest regard for the protests.
Development of the Nomonhan Incident
The Nomonhan incident, as was explained in the July number of TOKYO GAZETTE, had the same inception as the preceding border clashes. On May 11, some 80 Mongol regulars, armed with heavy artillery pieces, crossed the Halha River and entered Balshagal, southwest of Nomonhan, attacking the Manchoukuo border outpost there. The invaders were repulsed by the Manchoukuo border guards, but they renewed their attack on May 13 with
strong reinforcements brought up from the rear. At this juncture, the Japanese Azuma detachment was dispatched to the spot from Hailar. This detachment, in cooperation with Manchoukuo troops, pressed back the Outer Mongolian force to the western bank of the Halha on May 16. Then leaving a few squads on the border to watch the movements of the Mongols, the Azuma detachment returned to its barracks in Hailar.
It was not long, however, before the Mongol force, reinforced by Soviet regulars, again crossed the Halha. They first built bridges over the river and then started constructing fortifications on its eastern bank, which lies within Manchoukuo territory. The Kwantung Army then sent the Yamagata detachment to repulse the stubborn invaders. This detachment reached the Halha River on May 28, driving the Mongol and Soviet forces ahead of it. The Yamagata detachment returned to its base on June 1.
The Japanese up to that time had encountered approximately 2,000 Soviet-Mongol troops, including the Sixth Division of Outer Mongolian cavalry, 1,000 strong and armed with 10 guns, a Red Army unit of 500, which included an infantry battalion supplemented with more than a dozen tanks and a large number of motor-lorries. In addition, there was a motorized unit of sharpshooters, dispatched from Ulanbator, capital of Outer Mongolia.
Sustaining a heavy blow at the hands of the combined Japanese and Manchoukuo forces, the enemy remained quiet until the middle of June. Meanwhile, aeroplanes and mechanised units were rushed to Tamsk, south of Lake Buir from the Soviet Union.
On June 15, the Soviet-Mongol troops again started operations near the confluence of the Halha and Holstein Rivers, establishing positions on the eastern bank of the Halha, as they had done before. Part of them penetrated deep into Manchoukuo territory and attacked the Japanese garrison at Chiangchunmiao, while Soviet bombers flew 150 kilometres into Manchoukuo territory and bombed Halunarshan, the railway terminus.
The Kwangung Army decided to launch another counter-offensive. In conjunction with the Manchoukuo forces, they started operations at midnight, July 1, and faced the enemy front lines the following evening. After 10 days of fighting, the Japanese-Manchoukuo forces succeeded in expelling the invaders from Manchoukuo territory. The strength of the Soviet and Outer Mongolian forces at that time was estimated at 10,000 men, including the bulk of the Eastern Mongolia garrison forces as well as troops sent from the military districts of Transbaikal, Siberia and the Urals. The Japanese and Manchoukuo units then engaged in mopping up the enemy remnants, keeping a vigilant watch on activities across the border. Unwilling to admit defeat, the Soviet-Mongol forces erected strong artillery positions on the western bank of the Halha and watched for an opportunity to launch another attack while powerful reinforcements of mechanised and infantry units were being brought up from the rear. They made small-scale forays from time to time, but were repulsed on every occasion. At 3:30 o'clock on the morning of July 16, enemy bombers raided Fularki, international railway junction in Manchoukuo, and dropped eight bombs on the unfortified town.
One week later, 2,000 or more Soviet and Mongol infantry troops,
equipped with approximately 100 tanks, crossed the border, only to be driven back with heavy losses. At 7 o'clock the same morning, Japanese artillery units opened fire and silenced the enemy batteries on the western bank of the Halha. During the barrage, Japanese fliers also attacked the Soviet gunners.
The Soviet and Outer Mongolian air forces had lost some 700 planes up to July 25, from the beginning of the Nomonhan incident.1 To replenish their air force at the border, the Soviets sent a number of new planes to Outer Mongolia. Information shows that the Soviet and Outer Mongolian forces near Nomonhan consisted of one infantry division, half a dozen mechanised brigades and at least 300 planes, including S. B. and T. B. bombers and I-15 and I-16 pursuit planes, at the end of July.
Situation in Other Sectors
The border situation between Manchoukuo and the Soviet Union has witnessed no great change since the outbreak of the Nomonhan incident, but strict vigilance is being maintained in other regions by both sides and minor incidents are reported from various points along the border. On May 28, for instance, Soviet gunboats fired on three small Manchoukuo gunboats on the Jao River. Fires started in the Manchoukuo gunboats as the result of the shelling, and heavy casualties were caused. Again on June 1, a squad of Soviet soldiers crossed the eastern border at a point 14 kilometres southeast of Hunchun and started surveying Manchoukuo territory. They clashed with a Japanese infantry unit and left eight dead, while the Japanese suffered six wounded.
On the evening of June 3, two Soviet planes crossed the eastern border and dropped five bombs over Hsiaomaanshan, four kilometres northeast of Changlingtze. Again on June 12, two more Soviet planes crossed the eastern border south of Sanchakow, and dropped seditious handbills.
Although comparative quiet prevails along the border at the time of writing, brisk troop movements are reported in the Urals and Transbaikal.
Results of the Nomonhan Incident
A communiqué issued by the Kwantung Army Headquarters on July 28 states that the Japanese air force had shot down 715 Soviet and Mongol warplanes up to that date. During the same period, 520 tanks, armoured cars and motor lorries were destroyed, seven artillery companies liquidated and 12 artillery companies heavily damaged. The enemy left more than 3,000 dead and lost 90 prisoners. The Japanese also captured large numbers of tanks, armoured cars, motor lorries, artillery pieces, machine-guns, rifles, telephone equipment, maps, documents and a large quantity of ammunition.
1 Additional losses resulting from sporadic fighting in August brought the total number of demolished Soviet planes to 1,101, according to an official communiqué issued by the Kwantung Army Headquarters on August 22.
THE SITUATION IN CHINA
II
—FORCES OF THE IMPERIAL NAVY IN ACTION—
Publicity Bureau, Navy Department
Extension of Naval Blockade
THE Imperial Navy is now blockading the entire 2,850-mile China coast, from Shanhaikwan, on the Manchoukuo China border in the north, to the border between South China and French Indo-China, including Hainan Island in the south. The first proclamation for suspension of traffic along the China coast, applying to Chinese shipping, was issued in the name of the Commander-in-Chief of the Third Fleet, on August 25, 1937. Suspension of traffic since has been extended on several occasions, until it is now applied to the entire China coast. The Japanese fleet is making invisible but substantial contributions to the termination of the present conflict with China by patrolling China waters, seizing Chinese junks and cutting off the supply of arms to the Chiang Kai-shek régime. The warships on duty patrol not only the muddy waters of the Yellow Sea, but the South China Sea and inland waterways as well.
It is no easy task to patrol such a vast stretch of coastline. Although there is nothing spectacular about it, such as an encounter with a powerful enemy fleet, it calls for the constant vigilance of the Imperial Fleet against Chinese blockade runners who attempt to smuggle arms and war materials to the Chiang Kai-shek Government, and also against Chinese vessels which are disguised as third-Power ships and are used for similar purposes. In addition, the naval forces must fight the elements day and night. Their quiet role requires extraordinary patience and perseverance. The great contributions they are making to the cause of the Japanese crusade in China may sometimes escape public notice, but the officers and men in the naval service nevertheless are doing their best in the discharge of their duties, without caring for public acclaim.
In enforcing the suspension of traffic, attention first must be given the seaports. Since the outbreak of the current hostilities, the major ports of China have fallen to the Japanese, including Tangku, Chefoo, Weihaiwei, Tsingtao, Lienyunchiang, Haichow, Shanghai, Amoy, Canton, Hoihow (Haikow) and Yulin. The last two are in Hainan Island. These seaports have ceased to function entirely for the supply of military equipment to the Chinag [sic] Kai-shek régime. There remained, however, some treaty ports in South China, which were not yet occupied by the Japanese, and which were utilized by vessels of certain third Powers to supply the Chungking régime with vital necessities.
New operations, therefore, were started recently by the Imperial Navy against these strategic ports. Following the Swatow campaign of June 21, a Japanese naval unit, covered by warships and aeroplanes, effected a landing in the southern part of Chushan Island at the mouth of Hangchow Bay early on the morning of June 23. The same evening, the Japanese landing party occupied Tinghai, island capital. Taishan Island, north of Chushan, also was taken. The Chusan group consists of Kintang, Taishan and a number of tiny islets. They dominate not only Hangchow Bay and the mouth of the Yangtze River, but Ningpo and Chenhai, ports in Chekiang Province.
The Chungking régime had concentrated a large body of Central Army troops along the Tsientang River, with bases at Shaohing and Ningpo with the idea of bringing in war materials from abroad through Chushan Island, Ningpo and Shaohing. Chinese troops crossed the Tsientang River from time to time in attempts to invade Hangchow, capital of Chekiang. The Japanese occupation of Chushan Island, together with the earlier seizure of Swatow, therefore, has great strategic significance, upsetting as it does the Chinese plan of operations. Again on June 27, the Japanese naval force carried out a blockade against Foochow, capital of Fukien Province, and Wenchow, important seaport in Chekiang Province.
On July 12, the Imperial Navy decided to blockade Chuanchow, new treaty port in Fukien Province, as well as Tungshan and Chaoan, in the same province. Consequently, the Commander-in-Chief communicated with the foreign consular corps and the Chinese Maritime Customs Administration to the effect that Mr. Yoshiaki Miura, Japanese Consul-General at Shanghai, was requesting third-Power warships and merchant vessels to withdraw from those ports. At 8 o'clock on the morning of July 15, the Navy started operations to blockade the three ports.
Further tightening the blockade of the South China coast, the Imperial Navy captured Swabue in Kwangtung Province at 8 o'clock on the morning of July 18. Swabue lies halfway between Hongkong and Swatow, forming a transit point for the other two ports. It also is a centre of coastal trade in South China. Hinghwa, south of Foochow, was blockaded the next morning. The Powers were notified three days in advance in both instances.
Santuao, Loyuan and Shacheng, all ports in Fukien Province, were blockaded on July 21 and 22. Meanwhile, the Japanese naval authorities on July 26 informed the foreign consular bodies at Canton and Hongkong that the Pearl River would be closed to foreign shipping for two weeks, starting July 28.
The Japanese suspension of shipping hitherto has been in effect only off the China coast, but it now is enforced vigorously in the seaports as well. Japan is fully aware of possible friction with third Powers in trade questions, but is manifesting her solid national determination to deprive the Chiang Kai-shek régime of foreign assistance at all costs.
Suspension of port traffic has the same object as a coastal blockade, that is, in depriving the enemy of war materials. In view of the fact that the objective of the China Affair is the construction of a New Order in East Asia by crushing the Kuomintang Government and the Chinese armies opposing Japan for the sake of lasting peace in the Far East, and not in antagonizing the law-abiding Chinese people, war has not been declared by Japan against
China. In official terminology, therefore, the current conflict is not a war, but an affair. Therefore, the term blockade is not used formally, but instead the Navy's programme is called suspension of Chinese shipping or a "peace-time blockade." This practice is recognized by international law. Moreover, history shows that some of the Powers which are now criticizing the action of the Imperial Navy themselves have enforced "peacetime blockades" openly in the past.
A peacetime blockade is not directed against third-Power shipping in principle. Consequently, Chinese vessels frequently attempt to slip through the Japanese blockade under false colours. Japanese patrol boats therefore order all vessels of suspicious appearance to heave to while a boarding-party inspects them. The Japanese blockade units cannot seize munitions and other goods supplied by foreign Powers and destined for the Chiang Kai-shek Government, so long as they remain in neutral territory, leased territory or foreign bottoms. They are seized immediately, however, once they pass into Chinese hands. Such goods usually are landed at Hongkong, Macao or Kwangchow, French leased territory. From these points they are transhipped in Chinese junks for smuggling into Chinese ports.
Explanation must be made here of the reason the Navy has tightened its blockade of the South China coast. Nowadays any country, even in peacetime, cannot attain independence, existence and development by secluding itself from the outside world. The sea provides trade lanes, and seaports form the doors of international intercourse. It is hardly necessary to say what a severe blow a country would suffer if it had its door closed by another Power. Now, China is not an industrial country, and although she may have had a large stock of munitions before the outbreak of hostilities, her attempt to wage protracted warfare against Japan makes it necessary for her to import more munitions from abroad. It is true that there still are some routes by which the Chiang Kai-shek régime may import munitions. One is the so-called Red route in Northwestern China via Lanchow, capital of Kansu Province, through which China can procure munitions from the Soviet Union. Another is the Burma route. Still another is the French Indo-China route. Through the last two avenues, China can get what she needs from foreign countries via Yunnan Province. There are other overland and, of course, air routes. The topography of China, however, makes the sea-route most convenient because goods can be handled in greater volume and shorter time.
Now that the sea has been closed to the Chinese Government, the number of foreign vessels plying between Chinese ports since the beginning of the China Affair is clearly shown by statistics compiled by the Japanese blockade units. It is worthy of special notice that British shipping has topped the list of foreign vessels calling at Chinese ports since the start of hostilities.
Even after the Japanese occupation of Canton, which nullified the value of the Canton-Hankow Railway and the Canton-Kowloon Railway as supply routes, Hongkong has figured most prominently as a source of arms supply for the Chungking Government. These materials are landed at Hongkong, from where they are transhipped to Haiphong in French Indo-China, Swatow and other South China seaports.
After the fall of Tsingtao, Shanghai and Canton, the three major treaty ports of China, Swatow remained as the only available seaport for the Chinese Government. The port became crowded with shipping of third Powers friendly to the Chiang régime. During the three months which followed the fall of Canton, Swatow accounted for 38 per cent of the total foreign trade handled by the sea ports under the jurisdiction of the Chiang Kai-shek régime, thus occupying the foremost place among them. This was before the fall of Nanchang, capital of Kiangsi Province. Since the Japanese occupation of Nanchang, junction of the Chekan Railway and the Kiukiang-Nanchang Railway, which caused a disruption of the former line between Chekiang and Kiangsi provinces, Swatow gained further importance, veritably becoming the only major seaport left to the Nationalist Government.
Swatow enjoyed a very large excess of exports over imports. This shows what an important role it played in supplying the Chiang Kai-shek régime with war sinews by securing foreign currencies from its favourable balance of trade.
Swatow, together with Amoy, Chuanchow, Canton and Hainan Island, all are now under Japanese control.
The Kuomintang Government already has lost its major sources of revenue—customs and salt gabelle revenue—and is now facing loss of another no less important source of revenue in the form of remittance from Chinese nationals abroad. Its specie holdings in foreign countries also are being steadily drained, adding to its financial difficulty. But despite these factors, the Kuomintang is desperately continuing resistance against Japan, relying more and more on third Powers, particularly Great Britain, at the same time paying no heed to the suffering of the Chinese people. Such being the case, the longer Britain assists General Chiang Kai-shek, the more prolonged will be the suffering of the innocent masses. On the other hand, the Japanese blockade of the China coast will be tightened in proportion to the assistance rendered by Britain to the Nationalist Government. Viewed in this light, the policy of Britain is the main obstacle to the realization of peace in the Far East and the construction of a New Order in East Asia. Britain must be urged to reconsider her attitude. The Japanese for their part must be firmly determined to prosecute hostilities and carry on construction at one and the same time.
Second Anniversary of the Shanghai Campaign
The second anniversary of the outbreak of the Shanghai campaign was observed on August 13. In the summer of 1937, the month following the Marco Polo Bridge incident in North China furnished danger signals indicating imminent trouble in central and South China. The Japanese naval authorities on the spot exercised the utmost self-restraint, while protecting Japanese life and property, so as to prevent the outbreak of untoward incidents. The Chinese authorities, however, feverishly pushed war preparations in accordance with their fixed plan. In the Shanghai area, they defied the truce agreement and moved regular troops into the demilitarized zone, where they started the construction of defence works. They
threatened to overpower the Japanese with their military force, which was numerically far superior to the Japanese force. The wanton murder of Japanese naval Lieutenant Takeo Oyama and Warrant Officer Saito, on August 9, started the Shanghai incident. On August 13, the Chinese forces opened fire on the Japanese landing party, which was compelled to respond and to chastise the Chinese armies.
Lesson of the Shanghai Campaign
At the outset more than 100,000 Chinese troops had surrounded the International Settlement of Shanghai. The Japanese landing party was only 3,000 strong, though the Third Fleet was concentrated at Shanghai. The overwhelming odds against which the Japanese fought, complicated by delicate international aspects, placed the Japanese at a heavy strategic disadvantage. Indiscriminate aerial bombardments resorted to by the Chinese on and after August 14 intensified the seriousness of the situation. But the Japanese fought valiantly.
During the 10 days that passed before the vanguard of the Japanese military forces effected a successful landing in the Woosung sector, the Japanese landing party, less than one-fortieth the size of the enemy forces, bore the entire brunt of the Chinese attacks. Even when a large body of Japanese troops was deployed steadily south of the Yangtze estuary, the landing party, as the extreme left wing of the Japanese line, stubbornly defended the International Settlement against the Chinese assaults. Covered by the fleet and the naval air force, it succeeded in driving the Chinese forces back from the Shanghai area in conjunction with the military forces late in October, thus preparing the ground for the drive on Nanking.
During the entire campaign, the Commander of the Japanese landing party refrained from requesting reinforcements, placing full confidence in his men. Thus, the Shanghai Campaign resulted in an impressive victory for the Japanese, thanks to their high morale and the full utilization of modern weapons.
Development of the Naval and Military Operations
Indiscriminate bombings launched by the Chinese air force at the beginning of the Shanghai Campaign roused the Japanese naval air force to action. Transoceanic operations resolutely carried out by the Japanese naval air force proved so successful that not only was the the furious Chinese onslaught against the International Settlement checked, but the naval fliers had nearly liquidated the Chinese air force by the end of September.
The action of the Imperial Navy since has been marked by close co-operation and coordination with the Army in driving the Chinese forces into the interior. Landing parties have been active in various seaports of China; a naval unit has successfully pushed up the Yangtze River, and the naval forces have kept up their attacks on almost all important towns in central and South China. At sea, the Japanese fleet not only destroyed the Chinese navy, but suspended Chinese commercial shipping along the entire coast. The steady development of the military situation has called for
large-scale joint operations between the Army and Navy in various parts of China, including Hangchow Bay, Bias Bay, Hainan Island, and Swatow, where both fighting services have achieved brilliant successes.
Special mention must be made of the Combined Fleet of the Imperial Navy, which not only has firmly secured the command of seas in the Western Pacific, but has succeeded in precluding any possibility of undue pressure or intervention on the part of third Powers, particularly Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union. In this connection, it must be remembered that securing the command of the Western Pacific provides a key to the successful construction of a new China, while at the same time, the Imperial Navy bears further grave responsibilities in view of the heavy naval building programmes now being pushed by Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, France and other Powers.
In observing the second anniversary of the outbreak of the Shanghai Campaign tribute must be paid to the war dead as well as to the sick and wounded who fought so valiantly for the national cause. While wishing their families health and prosperity, we call upon the nation to redouble its endeavours for the achievement of the ultimate purpose of the present Affair, the construction of a New Order in East Asia.