Treaties, Laws and Speeches

THE SITUATION IN CHINA

I

COMPREHENSIVE RESULTS OF THE JAPANESE MILITARY OPERATIONS SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES (From July, 1937 to June, 1940)

BUREAU OF INFORMATION, WAR DEPARTMENT

1. Chinese Killed: 1,587,600.

This figure represents those counted by Japanese troops. If others are included, the losses sustained by the enemy, including casualties, desertions and surrenders are conservatively estimated at over 3,000,000.

2. Japanese Killed: 85,800.

3. Japanese Booty:

The booty listed above includes those major items. Enormous quantities of arms and ammunition, clothing and other materials captured are omitted.

4. Length of the War Front: 4,600 kilometres.

5. Japanese Occupied Area: 1,600,000 sq. kilometres.

Representing an area 2.4 times as large as the Japanese Empire, corresponds to one-sixth the surface of China.

6. Results of the Activities of the Military Air Force

(From July, 1937, to June, 1940)

(a) Losses dealt the Chinese air force

(b) Losses dealt the Soviet air force Manchoukuo-Outer Mongolia Border

Grand Total 1,934

(c) Japanese losses

II

TIGHTENING OF THE BLOCKADE AGAINST CENTRAL AND SOUTH CHINA

PUBLICITY BUREAU, NAVY DEPARTMENT

In accordance with tightening of the blockade against the Central China coast, as proclaimed by Vice-Admiral Shimada, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese fleet in China waters on July 15, a Japanese naval detachment started fresh operations in Hangchow Bay at dawn, July 16.

Reduction of the Paichi (Chenhai) and Changtiaotsui Forts: An attack on the Chenhai forts resulted in their complete occupation the same morning. The Changtiaotsui Fort was reduced the following day.

Occupation of Chenhai: These operations led to the occupation of Chenhai (outpost of Ningpo) on July 18, and of the islands which command the entrance.

Reduction of Chuanchow and Blockade of Hinghwa Bay: On July 17, a powerful Japanese fleet, in concert with the attack on Chuanchow, Fukien Province, moved in on Hinghwa Bay, 40 miles northeast of that town, and by sinking junks and placing obstructions in those waters, successfully closed the most important supply route in Fukien Province.

Attacks on Santuao and Shoutsun: On the morning of July 21, a landing-party gained a footing at Santuao against strong enemy resistance. The same afternoon, the Japanese entered Shoutsun, dismantled the Chinese military establishments and completely destroyed their lines of communication.

All these operations, which the Japanese Navy carried out in concert with the Naval air-units had for purpose the blockading of the outlet of the Chekiang-Kiangsi Railway, and the cutting-off of the supply route through these ports. Since the institution of the blockade more than ten foreign vessels were stopped and visited without incident. This tightening of the blockade against Central and South China ports has dealt a severe blow to the Chungking régime and the pro-Chiang foreign Powers.

III

AT SHANGHAI THREE YEARS AGO

PUBLICITY BUREAU, NAVY DEPARTMENT

August 13, is a day never to be forgotten by the Japanese nation, for that date three years ago, marked the opening of the Shanghai campaign, a

unique and most thrilling one in the annals of war, following the provocative challenge of the Chinese army.

In greeting this third anniversary of the outbreak of the campaign, we recall with gratitude the bitter fighting waged by the Japanese landing party in its earlier stages and the subsequent close cooperation between the Japanese military and naval forces around Shanghai for more than 70 days. At the same time we pay a glowing tribute to those who lost their lives and to the sick and wounded for the valour they manifested. We who live and are well take this occasion to pledge our renewed efforts for the construction of a new order in East Asia on the altar of their sacrifice.

The campaign was marked by a lightning landing of Japanese forces in the international city in face of strong enemy resistance, and the coordinated activities of Japan's land and sea forces, with the naval and military air arms. It provided the occasion for originating tactical moves of no little consequence and furnished by the peculiarities which surrounded it valuable instructions and suggestions on the disposal of the China Affair itself.

Movements of the Japanese Navy Before and After the Outbreak of the Shanghai Campaign

The China Affair was the outcome of the outrageous, anti-Japanese policy, assiduously and systematically pursued by the Chiang Kai-shek régime in defiance of international justice over a period of many years. Anti-Japanism was the instrument by which that régime attempted to bring the whole of China under its control. Hatred of Japan was the guiding principle in the moral training of young China and of the Chinese Army—a line of education which is against all the principles of humanity. For years previous to the outbreak of hostilities military service was enforced among the people with this country as the hypothetical enemy, while rapid rearmament was pursued under the guidance of Western military experts. This bolstered the growing conceit of the Chinese military and led the nation to over-estimate its strength. The belittling of Japan's resources, and the spread of the war sentiments through the length and breadth of China could not but bring about the regrettable situation which resulted in open hostilities. Following the incident at Sian, capital of Shensi Province in December, 1936, when Chiang Kai-shek was made prisoner by Chang Hsueh-liang and his Communist colleagues, Chiang concluded an arrangement for cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists in offering resistance to Japan. And there and then a basic policy to carry on warfare against her neighbour was formulated by China's two opposing groups.

The rising storm of anti-Japanese hatred manifested itself in terroristic outbreaks in various parts of the republic.¹

Nevertheless the officers and men of our China fleet exercised the greatest self-restraint upon all occasions. But the tide of anti-Japanese surged on to its climax in the Marco Polo Bridge incident of July 7, 1937. This was the signal for an open break between the two countries. The

¹ For the full account of the outrageous incidents, see an article entitled "Significance of the North China Problem" in the August, 1937, issue of TOKYO GAZETTE.

cause for all this was so deep-rooted that the spread of hostilities to Shanghai was inevitable, despite every effort on Japan's part to localize this incident. In August, the situation in Shanghai was suddenly aggravated. The Chinese army assumed a definitely provocative attitude, by constructing military works in the demilitarized zone along the perimeter of Shanghai, thus violating the truce agreement of 1932.

Japanese residents along the Yangtze River were advised to evacuate, their withdrawal commencing on August 1. By August 9 over 2,800 of them, under the protection of the Japanese Navy, were safely escorted to Shanghai from stations as far distant as 1,400 miles up that river. That same afternoon Naval Lieutenant Oyama and Warrant Officer Saito were butchered by Chinese troops, which added to the strain already imposed.

A settlement was sought, the Japanese landing party demanding the immediate withdrawal of the Chinese constabulary force from the demilitarized zone around Shanghai and the dismantling forthwith of the military works established on the perimeter. Instead of manifesting any sincerity in their negotiations, the Chinese military authorities became openly provocative steadily reinforcing their troops in and around Shanghai. At dawn, August 12, the Chinese 88th division arrived at the North Station by train and by lorry. Strong pillboxes which had been constructed in the compounds of the Greater Shanghai Municipal Government offices at Kiangwanchen and Chapei just outside the International Settlement were immediately manned and preparations made for action. The Japanese landing party, some 3,000 strong, thus found itself surrounded by forces ten times greater numerically which opened fire on them as the funeral services for the late Lieutenant Oyama and Warrant Officer Saito were being conducted at headquarters. In honour of the victims to Chinese atrocity, the Chinese army was brutal enough to fire upon the Japanese landing party, raising the curtain on the Shanghai campaign. It was the declared intention of the Chinese to annihilate not only the Japanese troops but also the 30,000 Japanese nationals then residing in Shanghai.

Crack units of the Japanese Navy were immediately despatched to reinforce their comrades as Vice-Admiral Ohkochi, Commander of the Japanese landing party, issued the historic order to his command, "Stand by and start fighting!" This was at 4:55 p.m., on August 13 when the Chinese troops opened fire upon the headquarters of the Japanese landing party. On August 23, our troops landed at Woosung against heavy odds as the Chinese forces had by this time swelled to 200,000. Signal credit is due to the Japanese Navy for the lightning sea and air operations by which victory at Shanghai was made possible.

Peculiarity of the Shanghai Campaign and British Obstructions

Spread of hostilities to Shanghai was inevitable, as it was part of the Chinese plan to engage Japan on that ideal battlefield for China. Through such a move Chiang hoped to involve those other Powers interested in that city in the conflict thus bringing about international complications

which might result in intervention against Japan. Moreover, Nanking the seat of the Government and the military centre of the country, was but a few hours away with every water and land facility for concentrating large bodies of troops around China's principal port. The Chinese military likewise placed great reliance upon the costly fortifications which had been constructed in that vicinity during the preceding five years.

Our movements were greatly hampered by the peculiar conditions which obtained. In fact there were occasions when the Japanese defenders were exposed to most serious danger on this account. Some of these peculiarities we shall enumerate below:

1. Chinese Partisans or Plain-Clothes Soldiers

Chinese partisans or plain-clothes men were the ones who first fired on a sentry of the Japanese landing party on August 13, thus precipitating hostilities. Armed in every way, it was their mission to carry the conflict well into enemy lines and disturb peace in the rear. The international status of Shanghai, which allowed for the free movement of these irregulars who found the situation an ideal one for their activities, was one of the most serious problems with which our forces had to contend.

2. Street Fighting

Another difficulty was presented by street fighting with which the Japanese landing party was not unfamiliar and in which it had been carefully trained. Nonetheless that form of fighting which could be long-drawn and undecisive proved a considerable disadvantage to our troops, who found their actions greatly restricted. With heavy reserves to draw upon in case of need the Chinese could carry their defence from house to house, street to street, and to dislodge them necessitated the complete razing of all buildings in the town.

3. International Settlement and French Concession in Shanghai

Foreign Shanghai comprises an International Settlement and a French Concession, surrounded on all sides by Chinese territory—a condition which obtains nowhere else in the world, this afforded the Chinese troops tactical advantages of which they were not slow to make use. They took up strong positions for instance in Chapei (near the North Station), and attacks directed against them from the side were accompanied by the danger of shells falling within the International Settlement. Every inch of ground gained had to be bitterly contested and at the price of heavy sacrifice of Japanese lives.

The Chinese made the fullest use of the advantages provided them by the contiguity of their territory to the International Settlement and the French Concession, and ran their own defence lines right alongside those of the foreign troops guarding the Shanghai perimeter. This allowed for no inconsiderable assistance to them from across the border in devious ways, and instances of this aid, in which the British were directly concerned and which could not but prove obstructive to Japanese operations, are many.

In the opening aerial attack on the "Idzumo" Chinese bombs falling

off their mark, severely damaged British-owned property close by. The British authorities requested that the "Idzumo" move away from her berth under threat of opening the Settlement barricades to the surrounding Chinese troops. The Chinese too were not debarred from access to tall buildings in the Settlement from which they were able to reconnoitre the Japanese lines. Our planes were fired at by anti-aircraft and machine-guns from the British-patrolled area. The besieging of the Joint Savings' Bank warehouse in which several hundred troops had barricaded themselves was another occasion for assistance and obstructive tactics. Provisions and water were supplied these troops from across the Settlement border and when, to evade capture, these men decided to make good their escape, the Settlement barricades were opened to assist them.

What took place at Shanghai was but the commencement of what went on during the whole campaign in China—the Chiang-aiding Powers treating the Settlements, which were in truth under the sovereign rule of China, as if they were their colonial possessions.

Japan is now engaged in the gigantic task of constructing a new order in Greater East Asia, with the same ideal as caused her to embark on the China Affair, namely the peace of the Orient. In recalling the Shanghai campaign we must renew our grim determination to cope efficiently with the current changes in the world by recognizing the gravity of the situation and establishing an intensive national defence structure on the basis of a new political structure.